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INTRODUCTION
This study addresses reforms in the 
higher education funding systems in se-
ven countries of Western Europe (Sweden, 
Norway, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, 
France, and Germany) between 1980. and 
2000. in an effort to identify key changes 
that occurred in the period and examine 
whether reform trajectories of the seven 
countries in this study follow coherent pat-
terns. Patterns of change are traced using 
the typology of welfare state regimes de-
veloped by Esping-Andersen (1990.). Esta-
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blishing such regularities in reform patterns 
would add weight to the historic institutio-
nalists’ assumption that institutions, in this 
case welfare regimes institutions, ‘structu-
re a nation’s response to new challenges’ 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996.). The period studied 
is marked by the marketization of higher 
education – the move towards introducing 
market-inspired funding mechanisms and 
more private money into higher education. 
The assumption is that key institutional 
features of a welfare regime will govern 
reform trajectories in higher education fun-
ding policies. 
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After the introduction, the study offers 
an analysis of key contextual factors that 
have infl uenced a doctrinal shift towards the 
marketization of higher education, and sec-
tion three provides a defi nition and analy-
sis of marketization mechanisms in higher 
education. These two elements are essential 
for understanding the nature of the reforms 
in the period. After that, Esping-Andersen’s 
typology is used in section four to develop 
assumptions about regime-typical trajec-
tories of higher education funding policy 
change against which individual countries 
are examined in section fi ve. Information 
is gathered from primary sources: country 
reports, legislation, policy papers, offi cial 
websites, and international organisations’ 
reports. Following Esping-Andersen’s ty-
pology, fi rst Scandinavian, then Liberal 
and Continental European countries are 
presented. The initial impression of all the 
countries converging on marketization re-
forms is exposed as more complex, and key 
differences are pointed out.
REFORMS IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION - FORCES OF 
CHANGE
This section analyses three main factors 
that infl uenced the 1980.-2000. reforms: 
increased participation in higher educa-
tion, changed economic realities and the 
rise of ‘knowledge society’ as an objective 
of European states. The last part charts the 
development of a change in doctrine that 
opened the way for marketization of higher 
education funding mechanisms.
The ‘Massifi cation’ of Higher 
Education 
Higher education systems in Europe 
expanded dramatically in student numbers 
from the 1960s to the 1990s1. This increase 
has been described as ‘massifi cation’ and 
represents, according to Theisens (2004.), 
one of the most profound developments in 
higher education in the developed world. 
The increased numbers of students had its 
fi nancial implications, thus spending on 
higher education in absolute terms grew 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s in all 
OECD countries (ibid.). However, in terms 
of relative spending per student, the amount 
of funding shrunk2 (Tilak, 2005.). These 
two major developments collided with a 
third and fourth development: 
‘The third is a change in economic pa-
radigms, that has led governments to 
realise that large state budgets and high 
taxation may cause economic problems. 
This realisation has led to a policy of 
cutbacks on state budgets, including the 
higher education budget. The fourth is 
the growing perception that higher edu-
cation is important to realise economic 
objectives. (Theisens, 2004.:15).
The third and fourth developments that 
Theisens identifi es are addressed in secti-
ons 2.2 and 2.3. Regarding the expansion 
of participation in higher education, a cru-
cial characteristic of Western European 
higher education systems is that they are 
dominantly publicly funded and as such 
1 In the UK participation rate in 1960s was 5%, growing to 30% by mid-1990s (Barr and Crawford, 1998.); 
in Sweden the number of new students in 1960./61 was 7,800 rising to 64,500 in 1997./98. (Eurydice, 2000.).
2 For example in the UK real funding per student fell by nearly 30% between 1990. and 1995. (Barr and 
Crawford, 1998.); Eurydice 2000. reports under-funding also in Germany, France and Ireland (of the countries 
included in this study).
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dependent on taxes. Table 1. shows public 
v. private expenditure on higher education 
in selected Western European countries3 
in 2002.
Systems that are highly dependent on 
public funds restrain access on the supply 
side because student numbers cannot ex-
pand beyond what government is able to 
fund (Barr, 1993.). In such a situation, ex-
pansion is possible in two ways. Govern-
ments can keep expenditure constant but 
admit more students, thus negatively affec-
ting quality, or they can increase the role of 
private funding, primarily by introducing 
tuition fees and loans (ibid). While restrai-
ning access or jeopardising quality by incre-
asing student numbers without adequate in-
creases in funding were characteristic of the 
period up and into the 1980s, this became 
unsustainable. Therefore, a move towards 
introducing more private money into higher 
education to allow for the sector to expand 
became the dominant funding policy in the 
period from the 1980s to the 2000s.
A Change in Economic Paradigm
In the advanced industrial economies 
of Western Europe, the welfare state was 
the product of the post-1945. settlement. It 
was designed on the premises that it would 
counter cycles of booms and recessions, of-
fset market failures and offer social protec-
tion (Pierson, 1994.). However, the 1980s 
saw an emergence of a ‘sustained intellec-
tual attack’ on the welfare state (Le Grand 
and Robinson, 1984.) and was followed by 
Table 1.
Public v. private expenditure on higher education in selected Western European countries, 2002.
Source: Adapted from OECD Education Online Database
3 for which data on private spending were available.
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cutting down the public sector and public 
spending in general. The belief that many 
of the economic, social and political pro-
blems of the period were attributable to the 
continuing growth of the welfare state was 
established as a dominant doctrine (Pierson, 
1998.). It appears that the retrenchment of 
the welfare state was a combined reaction to 
real economic diffi culty, but also to a chan-
ged perception of the role of the state in the 
economy (Theisens, 2004.). Firstly, poor 
economic performance created a budgetary 
strain on welfare and undermined the Key-
nesian doctrine of the virtuous circle betwe-
en public spending and economic growth 
(Pierson, 1994.). Secondly, a parallel move-
ment during the 1990s for members of the 
European Union was towards meeting the 
Maastricht criteria for the Economic and 
Monetary Union, which put further strain 
on state budgets (Green et al., 2000.), be-
cause countries were aiming to reduce bud-
get defi cits by restraining public spending. 
Therefore, signifi cant changes in policies 
on spending in higher education were a 
spillover from this economic policy para-
digm shift of restraining or reducing public 
spending initiated in the 1980s. 
Regarding the role of the dominant 
economic policy doctrine in Europe at 
that time, the Thatcher government’s re-
trenchment policy was very influential 
throughout the 1980s. The 1980s UK go-
vernment was committed to private market 
philosophy and espoused the primacy of the 
market over public provision4. While other 
European governments were not so decisive 
in their adoption of principles of competi-
tion, outsourcing and other elements of the 
market doctrine, its key points have by now 
penetrated all advanced industrial countries 
(De Boer et al., 2002.). According to some 
authors, something similar happened in 
education policy: 
‘Although its impact has been most 
marked in the English-speaking world, 
and particularly in Britain … educati-
onal neo-liberalism has found echoes 
in many states in Western and Eastern 
Europe. Neo-liberal education policy 
advocates have forcefully criticized 
bureaucracy and ‘producer capture’ in 
education, arguing that effi ciency and 
effectiveness are best achieved through 
market – or quasi-market – systems 
where autonomous providers com-
pete with each other for their share of 
the educational market’ (Green et al., 
2000.:55). 
Higher Education as a Source of 
Economic Growth
In the last few decades, higher education 
has been given a key role in the European 
nations’ economic policy (Deer and de 
Meulemeester, 2005.). Economic growth is 
seen as dependent upon the rise in the cu-
mulated educational level of its population; 
according to the OECD, a key indicator of a 
country’s potential to profi t from scientifi c 
and technological progress is its share of 
population that has attained tertiary qua-
lifi cation (2005.a). Table 2 illustrates the 
population (aged 25-64) participation in 
higher education for OECD countries.
More specifi cally, in 2000. the EU mem-
ber states committed themselves through 
the Lisbon Agenda to make Europe “the 
most competitive knowledge economy 
in the world” by the year 2010. The poli-
cy goal is for Europe to transform into a 
4 Intellectually the background for these ideas was developed by then infl uential critics of the welfare state: 
Hayek, Friedman, and the Public Choice School, primarily through the work of Buchanan, Tullock, and Downs 
(Le Grand and Robinson, 1984.). 
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knowledge economy in order to re-establish 
its global competitiveness, and in order to 
do that it needs to develop its human capital 
(Dill, 1997., Green et al., 2000.). Increasing 
productivity is also dictated by the ageing 
of European populations. Western Europe is 
‘facing huge demographic imbalances with 
very small working age cohorts ahead, and 
to sustain the elderly we must maximise the 
productivity of the young’ (Esping-Ander-
sen, 2002.). Higher education and its link 
to research and development are crucial for 
this goal. This partially explains why higher 
education policy has had such strong poli-
tical salience in the last decades, and also 
why a reduction in public spending for 
higher education has not been accompanied 
by reduced governmental intervention – re-
cent reforms in European higher education 
legislation have generally increased govern-
mental control over university management 
and the institutional goals and output (Gre-
en et al., 2000., Theisens, 2004., Deer and 
de Meulemeester, 2005.).  
While a clear calculus of the link betwe-
en investment into education and economic 
growth is impossible (Barr, 2000.) and the-
refore easily contested by reductionist eco-
nomic perspectives (see for example The 
Economist, Pay or Decay, January, 2004.), 
today it is commonly agreed that skill and 
knowledge are ‘fundamental to economic 
performance and crucial to survival in the 
increasingly competitive global economy’ 
(Green et al., 2000.). This increased awa-
reness of the fact that higher education 
brings signifi cant returns has re-fuelled 
debates as to the ratio among private and 
social returns to higher education. This de-
bate is key to the current policy changes in 
higher education funding. Private returns 
to higher education that have been identi-
Table 2. 
Tertiary attainment for age group 25-64 in OECD countries in 2002.
Source: OECD Factbook 2005.
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fi ed include better chances of employment5 
and higher average earnings (Barr, 1993.), 
while some of the wide social returns are 
societies’ increased overall capacity for 
technological change and advancement of 
knowledge (Abramovitz, 1991.) as well as 
the practical fact that a highly educated po-
pulation in well-paid jobs pays more taxes 
(Barr, 1993.).
Challenges to the Doctrine of Free 
Higher Education 
Free higher education guaranteed by the 
post-1945. welfare state was challenged in 
the 1990s in the UK and later on more wi-
dely in Europe. First of all, in debates about 
higher education funding, the value of pri-
vate returns came to the fore. ‘The public 
and collective nature of the educational 
project has been partially eclipsed, at least 
for the moment, by individualist aspirations 
and norms’ (Green, 1997.). Education came 
to be seen primarily as an investment in an 
individual’s future earning capacity since 
evidence showed that additional earnings 
gained by those who enter higher educa-
tion are substantial (Glennerster, 2003.). 
People with tertiary qualifications also 
have better chances of employment and 
better job security (Eurydice, 2005., Biffl  
and Isaac, 2002.). This opens up the ques-
tion of whether those who benefi t from this 
investment should repay some of its cost. 
That students should take on some of the 
cost has become a mainstream policy posi-
tion (Vossensteyn, 2002., Barr, 2005.) and 
has been the chief motor behind the change 
in higher education policy that occurred in 
the period: the introduction of tuition fees 
and the replacement of grants with loans in 
many Western European countries. 
At the same time, an argument was 
growing according to which the espou-
sed policy goal of free higher education 
– social equity – was not happening. The 
post-war welfare state ‘failed to deliver on 
its promise of disconnecting opportunities 
from social origins and inherited handicaps’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 2002.:3) It appears that 
the impact of social inheritance is as strong 
today as it was in the past – in particular 
with regard to cognitive development and 
educational attainment (ibid.). After 50 
years of free access to higher education, 
there is still a ‘disproportionally small 
participation of groups of lower socio 
economic status’ (Biffl  and Isaac, 2002.). 
Further supporting this position, Le Grand 
and Robinson (1984.) argue that subsidies 
to university education are among the most 
inegalitarian uses of public funds: if they 
were withdrawn and the savings used to in-
crease everyone’s income equally, the poor 
would be better off and the rich worse off. 
This argument is strengthened by Biffl  and 
Isaac (2002.), who claim that free higher 
education is regressive because it subsidi-
ses higher income groups that are already 
overrepresented in the system. Finally, Vos-
sensteyn (2002.) quotes studies that show 
that student behaviour generally seems to 
be price inelastic – the gradual rising of fees 
in the Netherlands has not had an effect on 
participation rates.
To conclude, the dominant view regar-
ding investment into higher education since 
the 1990s has been that the private return 
to higher education is substantial, and that 
the system where higher education is free 
5 ‘During the period 1992.-2002., the unemployment rate among people with tertiary education qualifi ca-
tions aged 25-64 was lower than the overall unemployment rate in all countries for which data were available, 
with the exception of Denmark which recorded unusually low unemployment rates in 2001. and 2002. The idea 
that a tertiary education qualifi cation reduces the chance of unemployment is thus well founded in all European 
countries.’ (Eurydice Statistical Report on Education in Europe, 2005.: 39).
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is ‘pro rich in its outcome’ (Glennerster, 
2003.). These arguments formulate the 
doctrinal basis for policy change in higher 
education funding in the period between 
1980. and 2000. in Western Europe. After 
the sources of change have been identifi ed, 
the next task is to defi ne the main characte-
ristics of this change (section 3) and fi nally 
to investigate country evidence to establish 
whether the change follows coherent pat-
terns (section 4 and 5).
MARKETIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION: KEY 
DEVELOPMENT IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION POLICY IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 1980.-2000.
The previous section highlighted three 
crucial factors that propelled higher edu-
cation policy on the political map and 
prompted reforms: increased participati-
on in higher education, fi nancial austerity 
coupled with a change in economic policy 
doctrine, and fi nally the policy goal of crea-
ting a ‘competitive knowledge society’. The 
questions all Western European countries 
are asking themselves today are how to 
fund the expansion and what proportion of 
funds should come from the taxpayer, i.e. 
the student and/or his or her family (DfES, 
2004.). Since the most prominent move 
has been towards introducing more priva-
te funds into higher education, there is no 
dispute in academic circles that the policies 
adopted since the 1980s onwards represent 
a ‘marketization’ of higher education (Dill, 
1997.). Because the marketization label 
has come to be used very extensively, it 
is necessary to clearly distinguish its me-
anings under analysis here. Following the 
distinction between higher education ins-
titutions funded directly via a government 
grant, or through students as demanders of 
higher education services who pay fees and 
user charges (Barr, 1993.), two main types 
of marketization are distinguished: the in-
troduction of performance-related funding 
mechanisms (quasi-market element) and 
the introduction of tuition fees and loans 
(the privatization of higher education). 
Performance-related funding 
mechanisms
Since the latter part of the 20th ct. higher 
education institutions in Europe have over-
whelmingly been fi nanced out of the public 
budget through a system of block grants. 
Since the state is not the direct provider of 
the service in the sphere of higher educati-
on, an effective way for it to exert infl uence 
is through the use of fi nancing mechanisms. 
In the last two decades Western European 
governments have sought to introduce gre-
ater responsiveness, competitiveness and 
cost-awareness into university governance 
and generally infl uence university policy 
through the power of the purse. The main 
types of funding mechanisms introduced in 
the 1980.-2000. period are:
I. competitive funding where institutions 
compete against each other for money 
from an allocated fund; for example, in 
the UK the governmental assessment of 
research quality (RAE6) is used to dis-
tribute competitive funds for research;
II. demand funding where funds follow 
the student through voucher schemes 
or enrolment numbers; for example a 
voucher scheme is to be introduced in 
the Netherlands from 2007.;
III. output funding tied to specifi c targets 
set by the government; the Norwegian 
government, for instance, ties funds to 
number of credits the students produce
6 For more information see Research Assessment Exercise: http://www.rae.ac.uk/ .
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This policy change corresponds to the 
change in the economic paradigm that hap-
pened in the 1980s, when private sector va-
lues and management practices increasingly 
penetrated the public sector. The dominant 
doctrine in public management became one 
of the market and individualism (Hood, 
1998.), the chief characteristics of which are 
the support of competition and individual 
choice, as well as a drive for effi ciency and 
output-measurements of success in policy 
implementation. 
Privatization of higher education 
The introduction of tuition fees and the 
replacement of grants with loans signals the 
privatization of higher education – the shif-
ting of the cost of higher education from the 
government onto the students and/or their 
families, or in other words from public to 
private money (Tilak, 2005.). Firstly, until 
1980., apart from a few rare exceptions, 
higher education was free or almost free 
for students in Europe (Eicher, 2000.), 
while now most countries either charge 
(e.g. UK, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium), 
or are debating (e.g. Germany, Ireland) the 
introduction of fees. Secondly, while earlier 
governments provided support for students’ 
living costs, mainly in the form of grants, 
there has been a shift towards the increased 
provision of loans for living costs. Finally, 
universities are increasingly encouraged 
to develop links to the business sector and 
strengthen that source of funding. Howe-
ver, co-operation between academia and 
the business world is not taken up in this 
study since it represents a complex issue 
that goes outside the focus of this analysis 
and merits attention on its own.
Taking these changes into conside-
ration, it is important to emphasise that 
today’s European higher education systems 
still remain dominantly public7 (Green et 
al, 2000.). The introduction of different 
models of performance-related funding 
mechanisms has been much stronger and 
widespread than the move to increased 
reliance on private funding. Indeed, tying 
specifi c targets to public money has appea-
led to most governments striving for effi ci-
ency in a time of fi scal stress. On the other 
hand, increased reliance on private money 
through the introduction of tuition fees is 
the most direct way of introducing the mar-
ket into higher education and this policy 
still provokes a lot of public controversy 
(Barr, 2005.). OECD review teams visiting 
Scandinavian countries in 1998. were told 
that ‘fees were neither wanted nor needed’ 
(Biffl  and Isaac, 2002.). 
To summarize, the current trend in fi -
nancing mechanisms is to tie public funds 
to specifi c targets or make universities com-
pete for public funds, which means using 
the logic of the market without actually 
letting the market in. As long as the system 
remains overwhelmingly publicly fi nanced 
and governed by the state, there are no mar-
kets in higher education. Instead, the resul-
ting system is best defi ned as a ‘quasi-mar-
ket’. This means that it is a market because 
independent higher education institutions 
compete for funds and/or customers, and it 
is quasi because higher education institu-
tions are not private and are not motivated 
by profi t-maximising, and because in most 
cases, it is not the direct user who exercises 
choices concerning purchasing decisions - 
the government does it for them (Le Grand 
and Bartlett, 1993.). Most importantly, the 
system is a quasi-market because the price 
mechanism is absent – the government still 
covers the costs of education for the student. 
However, when tuition fees are introduced 
the system becomes less quasi and more a 
market. If the government determines the 
7 See Table 1.
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amount and sets up a fl at fee, the market is 
still restrained, even though the ability to 
pay starts to operate. But once higher edu-
cation institutions are allowed to set their 
own fees, the price mechanism begins to 
operate and this is when a market in higher 
education is in place. No Western European 
country has introduced such a system to 
date, but it can however be kept in mind as 
the end stop on the marketization journey 
many countries in Western Europe have 
embarked on.  
 ESPING-ANDERSEN’S 
WELFARE STATE REGIMES 
TYPOLOGY
This study aims to establish whether 
regularities exist in the trajectories of po-
licy change in Western European countri-
es. Its intention draws on a body of work 
with in comparative policies broadly termed 
the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature. The 
main assumption is that Western European 
countries differ in the types of capitalist re-
gimes they have developed since 1945. and 
that the character of their institutions condi-
tions their further development8. Since the 
focus of analysis here is higher education 
funding policy, the most appropriate typolo-
gy seems to be one that focuses on aspects 
of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990.) typology is used, which establis-
hes three types of welfare state regimes: 
the Scandinavian, Liberal and Continental 
European welfare regime (2002.). The ty-
pology is based on the relationship between 
the market, state and family: each welfare 
state regime places its key strength on one 
of the three pillars. Studying welfare sta-
tes within the distinction between states, 
markets and family frames the question in 
terms of the state’s larger role in organizing 
the economy. Adopting the distinction be-
tween regimes implies an understanding 
of the relationship between the state and 
economy as ‘a complex of legal and orga-
nizational features (that) are systematically 
interwoven’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990.:1). 
Esping-Andersen’s typology is used here 
to create assumptions about expected pat-
terns of change in higher education funding 
policy in the three welfare regimes. Table 
1. represents a brief summary of the typo-
logy containing the elements later used for 
analysis.
The Scandinavian welfare state regi-
me is characterised by a key emphasis on 
the government pillar. The welfare state 
is designed to strengthen individual inde-
pendence by ‘de-familializing’ welfare res-
ponsibilities, and to minimize the degree to 
which an individual’s welfare depends on 
the market, thus ‘de-commodifying’ its ci-
tizens (Esping-Andersen, 2002.). Extended 
to the policy of funding higher education, 
the rationale of de-commodifying and de-
familializing would in essence translate 
into free access to higher education and 
8 Examples of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature: Berger and Dore eds. (1996.), Crouch and Streeck 
eds. (1997.), Esping-Andersen (1990., 2000.), Scharpf and Schmidt (2000.), Hall and Soskice eds. (2001.), Sc-
hmidt (2002.).
Welfare state regime Scandinavian Liberal Continental
Prototype Sweden UK Germany
Group Denmark, Norway, Finland, The Netherlands Ireland, Switzerland Austria, Belgium, France, Italy
Constituting pillar state market family
Table 3.
Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare state regimes
24
Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 1, str 15-35, Zagreb 2006. Dolenec D.: Marketization in Higher Education Policy: An Analysis...
substantial fi nancial support for students 
irrespective of family income. The govern-
ment considers itself responsible for ena-
bling wide and equitable access to higher 
education. 
Unlike the Scandinavian model, the 
Liberal model is the model of a residual 
welfare state: benefi ts are targeted to the 
demonstrably needy, while the state acti-
vely sponsors market solutions by encoura-
ging private welfare provision as the norm 
(Esping-Andersen, 2002.). Taken over into 
higher education funding policy, the ratio-
nale should be one of encouraging market-
type mechanisms in funding, provision and 
management, and fi nancial support only 
for students in the most threatened inco-
me-bracket group. A Liberal regime would 
generally disbelieve central regulation and 
emphasise individual returns to higher edu-
cation investment. 
Finally, the key characteristic of the 
Continental model is its emphasis on tra-
ditional familial welfare responsibilities, 
as these states are typically strongly infl u-
enced by the Catholic Church. The state is 
strongly committed to the preservation of 
the traditional family-hood (Esping-Ander-
sen, 2002., Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000.). 
However, in the Continental model the 
drive for market effi ciency and commodi-
fi cation is not pre-eminent and social rights 
have a wider and stronger guarantee than 
in Liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Ander-
sen, 1990.). Translated into higher educati-
on funding policy, these countries protect 
free access to higher education, but count 
primarily on family support and therefore 
provide only supplementary fi nancial sup-
port for students. 
The above claims about regimes’ ideal-
type characteristics introduced assumptions 
regarding the fi rst type of marketization de-
velopment: the privatization of higher edu-
cation by the introduction of tuition fees and 
reduced state support for students. Table 4. 
schematises these claims that are used later 
on for country analysis. The table represents 
ideal types – it is expected that empirical 
evidence will not fold neatly into these ca-
tegories, but should show clear gravitation 
toward one of the ideal types.
However, with regard to the second 
marketization development identifi ed, i.e. 
the introduction of market-like mechanisms 
into direct government funding, a slight-
ly different basis for analysis needs to be 
adopted since Esping-Andersen’s typology 
does not seem to lend itself to hypothesi-
sing on this development. Instead, Titmuss’ 
(1958.) infl uential early study of variation 
between welfare states is used. Titmuss es-
tablished a basic distinction between resi-
dual and institutional welfare states. In the 
residual state, the state assumes responsi-
bility only where the market fails; in the 
institutional, the welfare model is univer-
salistic and so it extends welfare commit-
ments to all areas of distribution vital for 
societal welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990.). 
Extended to the issue of higher education 
funding, this logic of minimal state inter-
Welfare state regime Scandinavian Liberal Continental
Fees No Yes No
Grants or loans for 
fees? N/A
loans, partial grants for 
lowest income-brackets N/A
Grants or loans for 
living expenses?
both grants and loans available, 
not contingent on family income
(everyone is eligible)
loans
(everyone is eligible)
grants and loans available based on 
mean-testing of family income (eligibility 
conditional upon family income)
Table 4.
Fees and student fi nancial support 
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ference means that Liberal regimes would 
shy from introducing funding mechanisms 
that represent strong governmental regula-
tion. Output funding based on government-
set objectives and targets goes against the 
idea of the autonomous university and of 
the minimalist government. Therefore, it 
is to be expected that Liberal regimes will 
be introducing competition and demand-
driven funding, but not so much funding 
tied to government’s objectives. Titmuss’ 
(1958.) institutional welfare states, or in Es-
ping Andersen’s typology both Continental 
and Scandinavian regimes, should on the 
other hand make extensive use of output 
funding and be more wary of introducing 
competition and demand-funding. 
ANALYSING ESPING-
ANDERSEN’S TYPOLOGY 
AGAINST COUNTRY EVIDENCE
This section presents country evidence. 
Information is gathered from primary sour-
ces: country reports, legislation, policy 
papers, offi cial websites, and internatio-
nal organisations’ reports. Scandinavian 
countries are presented fi rst, and then Li-
beral and Continental European countries. 
Sweden, the UK and Germany are chosen 
as prototypes following earlier precedent 
(Esping-Andersen, 2002., Scharpf and 
Schmidt, 2000.). The second country within 
the cluster (Norway, Ireland, and France) is 
used to increase the number of observable 
implications of the theoretical assumpti-
ons made in section 4 in hope of a better 
evaluation of the theory (King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994.). The Netherlands is the 
third country in the Scandinavian cluster; 
it is chosen as a known innovator in higher 
education policy and as such an presents 
an interesting case to compare to the more 
‘typical’ Swedish and Norwegian ones.
Scandinavian Welfare State 
Regimes
Governments in this cluster led an acti-
ve policy towards higher education in the 
period between 1980. and 2000. and acted 
promptly to the changing environment in 
higher education. As a result, their systems 
are up-to-date and are not suffering from 
under-funding. In Sweden, the increase in 
student numbers was complemented with 
a corresponding increase in funding – even 
during the time of fi nancial austerity in the 
early 1990s, investment priority kept educa-
tion suffi ciently funded (Eurydice, 2000.). 
Similarly, Norway has a very high partici-
pation rate: it expects to have 36% of the 
working force with higher education qua-
lifi cations by 2010. Also, it has developed 
a capacity that can accommodate around 
50% of the annual cohort - it now aims at 
stabilizing at this percentage and does not 
aim for further expansion (ibid.).
Neither Sweden nor Norway charge tui-
tion fees. In the two countries, higher edu-
cation institutions (HEIs) can only charge 
small amounts like a union fee or term fee 
for student welfare. Furthermore, student 
support systems are comprehensive, based 
on a fundamental idea that ‘all students who 
need help to fi nance their studies should 
receive assistance from the central gover-
nment for this purpose’ (see www.sweden.
gov.se). Also, in both countries governmen-
tal aid is not based on the economic circum-
stances of the students’ parents or spouses. 
In Sweden, study assistance consists 
of a combination of grants and loans that 
are designed to cover students’ living ex-
penses. The total amount is currently SEK 
1,7259 per week for full-time students, of 
which the grant portion is 34.5%. Loan re-
payments were made income-contingent 
back in 1989., the same year as in Norway. 
9 € 185, currency exchange on August 12, 2005.; fi gures for autumn 2004. (www.sweden.se) 
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Norway considers the provision of student 
welfare of great importance for equality in 
access to higher education. Just as in Swe-
den, all registered students are eligible for 
government assistance. Assistance is awar-
ded on the basis of a living estimate, and the 
loan part is interest-free, income-contingent 
and to be repaid within 20 years after gra-
duation. The grant part has increased from 
13% in 1992./93. up to 30% in 2000./01. 
(Eurybase, 2000.). 
The Netherlands has a long traditi-
on of charging tuition fees (Vossensteyn, 
2002.). Ever since 1945., Dutch students 
have been paying a uniform fee determi-
ned by the government – for the academic 
year 2002./2003. the fee was € 1396 (Bo-
ezerooy, 2003.). These fees are relatively 
low, but there has been a public debate 
about introducing differential fees, which 
would probably imply higher fees. As for 
student assistance, the Netherlands has a 
unique system called a performance grant. 
According to Eurydice, students are entit-
led to government assistance until the age 
of 27, and the level of assistance is deter-
mined by a monthly budget that includes 
cost of living and tuition fees (2000.). The 
monthly budget is initially made available 
to the student as a loan with interest, but if 
s/he completes the fi rst year acquiring 50% 
of available credits, a part of the fi rst year 
loan is written off. Similarly, if the fi nal 
diploma is gained within the proscribed 
time, repayment of part of the loan is can-
celled (ibid.). Overall through this policy, 
the Dutch system has moved away from 
the full fi nancing of student maintenance, 
therefore increasing the cost-sharing contri-
bution of the students. However, the overall 
public contribution to students is still very 
considerable. 
A detailed study of the three countries 
presented would show that their systems 
are more complex than this overview might 
suggest. However, for the purpose of this 
study the data shown suffi ce to draw cer-
tain conclusions. The evidence shows that 
the three countries’ higher education sys-
tems overwhelmingly depend on public fi -
nance and this system of provision enjoys 
public support. The Swedish and Norwe-
gian systems of higher education are free 
for students and provide extensive student 
support. While the Netherlands charges tui-
tion, so far it has been kept relatively low 
and its complementing student aid program 
is comprehensive. This evidence conforms 
to the prediction that Scandinavian welfare 
regimes will aim to secure stable and suf-
fi cient public fi nancing, as well as student 
support mechanisms based on the principle 
of equal access. 
Turning to the reforms introduced into 
direct government funding during the last 
two decades, the picture is more diverse, 
but still consistent. At the beginning of 
the period under study, all three countries 
had distributed funds to HEIs via a block 
grant and on a ‘historical basis’ – alloca-
ting the grant based on the previous year’s 
budget usually consisting of student, staff 
and equipment costs. In Sweden the policy 
of decentralisation was complemented by 
introducing government control through 
output-funding throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. From 1993., HEIs are allocated 
funds via a three-year contract based on the 
minimum number of degrees to be awar-
ded in the period and a minimum number 
of full-time students. HEIs receive provi-
sional funds at the beginning of the budget 
year, and the fi nal amount is determined at 
the end of the year by taking account of the 
criteria mentioned. By tying funds to re-
sults, the government hopes that HEIs will 
make more effi cient use of their resources 
(Eurydice, 2000.). This is an example of 
both output funding and demand funding, 
because HEIs are awarded funds based on 
actual enrolment numbers, not last year’s 
estimates.
Similarly, in Norwegian higher edu-
cation the government sets the ‘stipulated 
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levels of activity’ (Eurydice, 2000.). In the 
2002. Quality Reform the funding formula 
was set, according to which 60% of the to-
tal allocation are ‘basic’, non-performance 
funds, 25% is performance-related based 
on the number of credits students obtained 
and 15% is the research component which 
is partly result-based allocation (OECD, 
2005.b). A 1995. reform introduced a re-
served sum of money that the universities 
compete for on the basis of the average 
number of credits obtained, which was a 
policy designed to shorten the duration of 
study. Finally, only recently has a govern-
mental committee for higher education issu-
ed a report recommending that a system of 
vouchers should be introduced, where part 
of the government funding would be allo-
cated through students’ choices (NMER, 
2000.). Therefore, Norway currently uses 
output funding and competitive funding 
and is debating the introduction of demand 
funding.
In the Netherlands a student voucher 
scheme has been scheduled for discussion 
in Parliament in summer 2005. According 
to Mark Rutte, the Dutch Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Higher Education, the re-
form will introduce a system of ‘learning 
entitlements’ from 2007., where each stu-
dent will receive a fi xed amount of entitle-
ments to ‘buy’ education. This will create 
a demand-driven system that is ‘supposed 
to turn students into critical consumers’ 
(Jongbloed, 2005.). The idea is that com-
petition will enhance effi ciency and qua-
lity. Within the funding system currently in 
operation, direct government funding has a 
performance-related component based on 
student numbers and the number of degre-
es (Eurydice, 2000.). Finally, the Nether-
lands has had a mechanism of competition 
for research funds based on peer-review in 
place since 1983., the earliest of any of the 
countries included in this study. Like Nor-
way, the Netherlands is already using com-
petitive funding and output funding, with 
plans to introduce demand funding.
Not only do the Scandinavian regime 
countries make use of output funding, but 
they are the biggest innovators in making 
use of competitive and demand funding 
mechanisms as well. This seems to go 
against the assumptions made on the basis 
of welfare regime characteristics. However, 
the key feature of the Scandinavian welfa-
re regimes is their safeguarding of public 
higher education from the market. As it has 
been said in section 2, the introduction of 
quasi-market mechanisms on their own, 
without withdrawing public funds, does not 
create a market in higher education. There-
fore, the measures introduced can be explai-
ned as the governments’ desire to make the 
best possible use of public funds. In other 
words, the described funding mechanisms 
are best understood as innovations in regu-
latory mechanisms of higher education. 
The introduction of quasi-markets and 
privatization measures needs to be analysed 
together in order to get a complete picture 
of higher education funding policy. Scan-
dinavian welfare regimes are on the one 
hand forwarding a philosophy of output-
measurement, competition and individual 
choice, but on the other they are protecting 
the higher education sector from the market 
by securing suffi cient funds both for institu-
tions and students. This evidence supports 
the hypothesis made on the basis of welfare 
regimes’ typology.
Liberal Welfare State Regimes
The UK system has always been charac-
terised by a liberal legacy, with state inter-
vention discouraged everywhere except 
‘where it is absolutely unavoidable’ (Green, 
1997.). British higher education institutions 
enjoy great autonomy over administration, 
management, staffi ng, admission policies 
and nearly every other aspect of university 
politics.  Until 1981. ‘there was very little 
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government policy for higher education’ 
(Kogan and Hanney, quoted in Bleiklie, 
2001.:13). However, a large public sys-
tem of higher education was created in the 
20th century, primarily following the 1963. 
Robbins Report which outlined the govern-
mental policy of raising participation (Eury-
dice, 2000.). Like other Western European 
countries, Britain entered the 1980s with 
a comprehensive public system of higher 
education. 
Until 1990., UK students at a UK uni-
versity paid no tuition fees and received 
a tax-funded maintenance grant to cover 
living costs (Barr and Crawford, 1998.). 
However, already in 1981. PM Thatcher 
started reducing expenditure on higher and 
further education by 8% over the following 
three years – this was seen as a signifi cant 
change in policy that initiated the resha-
ping of higher education under conditi-
ons of severe resource restraint (Eurydice, 
2000.). All throughout the 1980s partici-
pation continued to rise, however in 1992. 
the government again forwarded measures 
to limit public expenditure by limiting the 
number of students and lowering funding 
per student. The most important policy shift 
in funding, however, was the decision, fo-
llowing the 1997. Dearing Report, to char-
ge student fees (Green et al., 2000.). From 
1998. onwards, students have been paying 
a fl at fee determined by the government10. 
Their contribution towards tuition is me-
ans-tested, so poor students pay lower or 
no tuition fees based on their, their parents’ 
or spouse’s income. 
Reforms to student fi nancial aid were 
introduced earlier, in 1990., when means-
tested grants for maintenance costs were 
supplemented with loans, with the grant 
and loan ratio equalising by 1996. (Eury-
dice UK, 2000.). In 1999. maintenance 
grants were completely replaced by loans. 
Further reform measures were passed in 
Parliament in 2003. and will come in ef-
fect in 2006.: in England11 variable fees 
will be introduced with a £3,000 cap and 
up-front fees abolished. Students are expec-
ted to fi nance tuition and maintenance costs 
through an income-contingent loan, while 
the government will continue to meet some 
of the tuition and maintenance costs for the 
poorest students (Glennerster, 2003.). Key 
policy changes here are differential fees and 
income-contingent loans. Differential fees 
should introduce the price mechanism into 
the system - however, since according to the 
latest estimates almost all universities will 
charge the maximum £3,000,12 that policy 
does not seem successful. Income-con-
tingent loans mean that there is no longer 
means-testing of parents’ income (Barr and 
Crawford, 1998.).
With the latest round of legislation, the 
UK has introduced far-reaching privatiza-
tion reforms in higher education funding. 
The funding system is now based on tuition 
fees and income-contingent loans. Students 
are given fi nancial responsibility over their 
choices and commitments towards invest-
ment of time and money into higher educa-
tion. Regarding funding formulas, the UK 
has not introduced many market-inspired 
innovations; in the Netherlands, for exam-
ple, these developments went much further 
(Theisens, 2004.). In the UK teaching and 
research are funded separately. In funding 
10  For the 2004./2005. academic year they were £1,150 (HEFCE 2004.).
11 The Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament made somewhat different arrangements. Welsh universit-
ies will charge differential top-up fees to English and Scottish students, while Welsh students will still pay the 
means-tested fl at fee of £1,200. Scottish students currently pay a £2,145 endowment for their four-year degrees 
after they graduate and that is not expected to change (‘No Top-up fees for Welsh students’ The Guardian June 
22, 2005., ‘Scotland to raise tuition fees for English students’ The Guardian June 20, 2005.).
12 The Guardian, January 6, 2005.
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teaching Britain has been applying the con-
ventional block grant based primarily on 
last year’s expenses. In funding research 
however the UK has had a competitive per-
formance-related system of funding ever 
since 1985., when the Research Assessment 
Exercise was introduced (Bleiklie, 2001.). 
Based on this assessment of their research 
performance university departments are ar-
ranged hierarchically and funds follow that 
ranking closely. 
As a short summary, in the UK the 
‘marketization’ reforms went furthest re-
garding the introduction of private money 
into higher education, which conforms to 
the welfare regime typology as espoused by 
Esping-Andersen (1990.). Regarding fun-
ding formulas tied to public funds, the UK 
is using competitive funding, but not output 
funding. The liberal legacy of non-gover-
nmental interference explains this lack of 
government enthusiasm for imposing ob-
jectives and targets. As for demand funding, 
the UK is using this mechanism, but via 
another measure – tuition fees. Since HEIs 
will be funded directly by students, they 
will compete for them, which is another 
way of installing demand-funding.
Turning to the Republic of Ireland, ac-
cording to Esping-Andersen, this is another 
country characterised by a Liberal welfare 
state regime (2002.). Prior to reforms in 
the mid-1990s, the Irish higher education 
funding system largely resembled that of 
current UK practice. Apart from gover-
nment funding, the largest proportion of 
funds fl owing into higher education was 
from tuition fees. However, reports on ac-
cess and participation at the beginning of 
the 1990s warned of increasing social in-
equalities and thus overcoming economic 
and social disadvantage became an issue 
high on the political agenda. This happened 
during a period of unprecedented economic 
growth in Ireland: in the period 1990-1995 
the average annual growth rate was 4.78% 
and from 1995. to 2000. it rose to 9.5% 
per annum, bringing with it far reaching 
social change (OECD, 2004.). Increasing 
wealth might explain why at a moment 
when other countries were struggling with 
fi nancial cuts to higher education funding, 
Ireland decided to abolish student fees. 
From 1996., home and EU undergraduates 
had free access, and the loss to HEIs was to 
be compensated by the government. Howe-
ver, this policy resulted in a net decrease of 
funding - direct state support per student 
fell by €1,240 between 1995. and 2001. 
(Conference of Heads of Irish Universities, 
2003.). Even more disturbingly, after the 
abolishment of tuition fees the ‘great dispa-
rities continued to exist in the participation 
of students from families of different socio-
economic status (OECD, 2004.). The Irish 
experience seems to corroborate Vossens-
teyn’s (2002.) claims about the inelasticity 
of student demand. 
The reintroduction of fees is currently 
being strongly advocated by both the acade-
mic community and the Higher Education 
Authority, which is Ireland’s governmental 
agency in charge of higher education po-
licy and planning. However, the govern-
ment is not preparing their re-introduction 
at this time. As for student fi nancial sup-
port, a Higher Education Grants scheme 
awards means-tested maintenance grants 
to undergraduate students and tuition and 
maintenance grants to postgraduate stu-
dents. About 37% of third level students 
received these grants in the year 2000./01. 
(HEFCE-OECD, 2004.). In 2002./03. the 
Department of Education and Science un-
dertook a major review of third level tuiti-
on fees and student support which, among 
other things, considered the introduction 
of some type of student loans system to 
replace the free fees system; however, the 
government has not announced any charges 
in the existing system.
Regarding funding mechanisms, Ire-
land has a system similar to the UK – core 
funding for teaching is allocated as a block 
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grant, calculated on previous’ years expen-
ses. The difference is that in Ireland this 
funding mechanism applies both to teac-
hing and research – there is no competitive 
assessment in the basic research funding 
(OECD, 2004.). The Higher Education 
Authority’s 2004. position paper proposes 
an increase in the proportion of the funds 
allocated competitively and also suggests 
that the core element should include per-
formance-related elements like student 
numbers and output criteria; however the-
se measures have not yet been adopted or 
implemented. 
Evidence from Ireland and the UK ex-
poses their key characteristics as Liberal 
regimes. However, their closer comparison 
regarding the introduction of quasi-market 
mechanisms and privatization shows that 
while the UK conforms to the assumptions 
of the welfare regimes’ typology, Ireland 
overall does not. They are similar in that 
neither of them has made extensive use of 
performance-related funding mechanisms. 
As for privatization measures, Ireland abo-
lished fees in 1996., while the UK intro-
duced them in 1998. Both countries used 
to support students through maintenance 
grants, but in the 1990s Britain moved on 
to income-contingent loans, while Ireland 
still has the same system in place. Ireland 
is an exception among all the countries in 
this study in how late it joined the advan-
ced industrial countries. Its rather unique 
development, especially over the last two 
decades, arguably explains the unexpected 
policy of abolishing tuition fees and the 
continual state support of students through 
maintenance grants. In a time of unprece-
dented growth, the public mood in Ireland 
called for a measure that would alleviate the 
severe inequalities of participation among 
various income groups. 
Continental European Welfare 
Regimes
France and Germany have traditionally 
had free, or virtually free, higher education 
(Glennerster, 2003.). In 2002. the German 
Federal Education Minister, SPD’s Edel-
gard Bulhman, advanced the amendment 
of the Higher Education Framework Act to 
prevent German states (Länder) from char-
ging tuition fees. Her amendment was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court 
in January 2005., which in short meant the 
introduction of tuition fees in Germany: a 
milestone change in higher education poli-
cy in that country. The six Länder governed 
by the conservative CDU/CSU opposition13 
challenged the amendment before the co-
urt and after the ruling they immediately 
announced the introduction of tuition fees 
(Goethe Institute, 2005.). At this point, 
many aspects of this reform remain unclear: 
the amount of fees to be charged, whether 
revenue from tuition fees will be kept by 
the universities and, possibly most impor-
tantly, how the equity of access is going to 
be preserved - so far no defi nite proposal 
for changes to the student fi nancial support 
system has been put forth. 
The existing fi nancial support system 
was established in 1970s. It was based on 
the principle of family contributions: sta-
te support was seen as subordinate to the 
students’ and parents’ responsibility for 
student well-being. Furthermore, civil law 
stated that families should provide for their 
children’s upkeep throughout their entire 
education, even after maturity (Eurydice, 
1999.). All throughout the 1970s and 80s 
the state support for student aid decreased, 
and in 1990. a system of half-grant, half-
loan was introduced. In 1996. a provision 
was added, according to which the loan be-
came interest-bearing for students studying 
13 either alone or in coalition.
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beyond the maximum authorised period. 
In the same year registration fees were in-
troduced, charged to students in extended 
periods of study. These measures aimed to 
reduce the average length of study, but they 
were unsuccessful. Since the government 
consistently reduced the already low level 
of student support, students increasingly 
relied on working during their studies, thus 
taking longer to graduate. This corresponds 
to the prediction based on the welfare state 
typology, according to which Continental 
European welfare regimes are characteri-
sed by only partial student support, based 
on the assumption that the family will take 
care of the student. 
The German higher education system 
is the largest of all the systems reviewed 
here, with around 335 HEIs (Eurydice, 
2000.). It is also one of the most heavily 
criticized for under-investment (Küpper, 
2003., Hartwig, 2004.). A key problem in 
Germany was that the number of students 
doubled between 1970. and 1990., while 
fi nancial and other resources provided by 
the government remained constant (ibid). 
1990. brought unifi cation and with it further 
fi nancial strain to the government budget. 
In 1996. the federal government proposed a 
reform (‘Differentiation in the Distribution 
of Resources’ by the Standing Conference 
of Ministers, 1996.) that among other things 
proposed the introduction of performance-
related funding (Eurydice, 2000.). At this 
time the Länder were trying out block grant 
budgets in pilot projects; until the 1990s 
German states still had input-based line 
budgets which gave HEIs very little fl exi-
bility and autonomy over spending. Since 
the 1990s the Länder have been increasing 
HEIs’ managerial and fi nancial autonomy, 
but the primary drive for this was to shed 
workload in an environment of budget cuts 
(Hartwig, 2004.). Today all 16 Länder fund 
HEIs via block grants and allocate a part 
of the budget according to performance 
parameters14. 
Altogether, government funding of 
German higher education has undergone 
substantial reform, even though it has hap-
pened incrementally over a long period of 
time. Performance-elements introduced are 
a mix of competitive and output funding 
and in the German context they primarily 
represent attempts to make the most of the 
existing funding and prevent any waste in 
times of fi nancial austerity. However, con-
servative-led Länder have won the debate 
over introducing a key market-type reform 
leading to the privatization of higher educa-
tion – the introduction of tuition fees. This 
might prove as an infl uential policy change 
in Europe, since the German system is fa-
mous for free access to higher education. 
Similarly to Germany, the support 
for students’ living expenses is partial in 
France. Financial support is based on a 
means test of parental income, with low-
income limits and low sums that are awar-
ded (Glennerster, 2003.). The government 
grant is designed to cover half of real life 
and fees expenses at the maximum (Kaiser, 
2001.). According to Eurydice report, the 
student support system in France is ‘over-
14 Baden-Württemberg is presented as an illustration. HEIs in Baden–Württemberg are allocated budgets 
in two parts: the quantity-determined and the incentive part. According to Hartwig, HEIs compete for the qua-
ntity-oriented part of the funds on the basis of the number of students in their fi rst to tenth semester, number of 
graduates as an average of the last two years, level of acquired third-party-funds, and number of doctorates as an 
average of the last two years. The incentive part of the budget awards HEIs additional funds for reduced drop-out 
rates, an increase in the number of foreign students, female graduates and the proportion of women doctorates as 
well as the increase in third-party funds (2004.). These new ties to government funding were accompanied with 
the development of a Stability Pact, a 10-year contract between the government and HEIs that provides them 
with fi nancial planning security. Other Länder have introduced measures similar to these (ibid.). 
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complex, incoherent, ineffi cient and inequi-
table’ (2000.:333). Students pay no tuition, 
but they are obliged to pay an enrolment 
fee, which is determined by the government 
and is kept low. In private institutions, fees 
are determined by HEIs themselves, and are 
considerably higher (Kaiser, 2001.). 
Regarding funding policy, France uses 
the input-based allocation-model where 
previous’ year’s expenses form the base 
for calculating the amount of the grant. 
The only substantial innovation to funding 
mechanisms in the period 1980.-2000. was 
the introduction of ‘contractual policy’ initi-
ated by Education Minister Jospin in 1989. 
The aim of this policy is to give more au-
tonomy to universities and to enable them 
planning security, similarly to the German 
‘Stability Pact’ agreements. HEIs draw up 
four-year development plans that are trans-
formed into 4-year contracts after negotia-
tions with the education ministry (Kaiser, 
2001.). The policy allows for longer- term 
planning, but since it is not legally binding, 
the state has been known to go back on it 
(Eurydice, 2000.). 
Among all the countries surveyed in 
this study, France seems to have the most 
traditionalist approach to higher education 
funding and has yet to tackle both soluti-
ons for more effi cient government funding 
mechanisms and for introducing more 
money into the system. At this point, it does 
not seem to have moved in any considera-
ble way towards marketization, which has 
been the key movement in higher education 
reforms across Europe. It therefore presents 
somewhat of an exception. 
CONCLUSION
The main objective of the study was to 
test whether Esping-Andersen’s (1990.) 
typology of welfare regimes can be used 
to explain higher education funding poli-
cy change in Western Europe in the period 
between 1980. and 2000. Table 5. illus-
trates key features of the seven countries 
analysed.
Country Fees* Loans/grants* Funding model
Sweden no combination of grant and loan to cover full living expenses
block grant, combined with output funding  
based on real student numbers
Norway no combination of grant and loan to cover full living expenses 
block grant, combined with performance-
related funds (25% of total budget)
the Netherlands
yes, 
determined by 
government
performance grant to cover full living 
expenses
block grant combined with performance-
related funds tied to student number and 
number of degrees
Ireland no means-tested grants for living expenses
block grant determined on previous year 
expenses
UK
yes,
determined by 
government
loans for living expenses block grant determined on previous year spending
France no partial means-tested assistance for living expenses line-item budgeting based on inputs
Germany no partial means-tested assistance for living expenses
block grant combined with a small 
performance-related element
Table 5. 
Key features of higher education funding policy
*for undergraduate study.
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Overall, the welfare-regime typology 
proved to be a useful heuristic device to 
analyse recent reforms in higher education 
funding in Western Europe. An initial im-
pression of all the countries converging on 
marketization reforms was exposed as more 
complex, and key differences were pointed 
out. The study has shown that regularities 
do exist, and they broadly conform to the 
welfare regime typology. This is a relevant 
fi nding which supports the historic insti-
tutionalists’ assumption that institutions 
condition countries’ responses to policy 
change (Hall and Taylor, 1996.). Howe-
ver, countries did not completely conform 
to type. In part this is due to an inherent 
defi ciency of any ideal-type analysis: ide-
al types are simplifi ed models, and as such 
they are always too neat compared to the 
complexity of empirical fi ndings. Finally, 
an important element that might explain 
why some of the analysed policies do not 
conform to the assumptions of the typolo-
gy is that today higher education policy is 
increasingly formulated in the crossroads 
between the domains of social policy and 
economic policy. This study examined re-
forms through the lens of institutions of 
social policy; a more detailed analysis of 
economic policy - particularly labour and 
industrial policy - in these countries would 
shed further light on these fi ndings and pos-
sibly explain instances where evidence did 
not support the logic of welfare regimes.
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Sažetak
MARKETIZACIJA U POLITICI VISOKOG OBRAZOVANJA: ANALIZA RE-
FORMI POLITIKE FINANCIRANJA VISOKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ZAPADNOJ 
EUROPI U RAZDOBLJU OD 1980. DO 2000. GODINE
Danijela Dolenec
Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu
Zagreb, Hrvatska
Uspostavljanje obrazaca promjene politike fi nanciranja visokog obrazovanja u Za-
padnoj Europi u razdoblju od 1980. do 2000. godine glavni je cilj ove studije. Obrasci 
promjene prate se rabeći tipologiju režima socijalne države koju je uspostavio Esping-
Andersen (1990.). Osnovna je pretpostavka da glavna institucionalna obilježja režima so-
cijalne države upravljaju razvojem reforme u politici fi nanciranja visokog obrazovanja. 
Studija pokazuje da zakonitosti unutar režima postoje, te se uvelike podudaraju s tipolo-
gijom režima socijalne države. Ipak, države se ne priklanjaju tipovima u potpunosti. To je 
djelomično uvjetovano nedostatkom klasifi kacije idealnih tipova, no još je važnije to što 
se čini da je to uzrokovano činjenicom da se politika fi nanciranja visokog obrazovanja ne 
može u potpunosti objasniti kroz prizmu socijalne politike.
Ključne riječi: politika fi nanciranja visokog obrazovanja, marketizacija u visokom 
obrazovanju, režimi socijalnih država.
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